This study discusses how to compute and forecast long-term stock return volatilities, typically with a 5-year horizon or longer, using credit derivatives, and how such volatilities can be used in different areas ranging from the valuation of employee stock options and other long-term derivatives to the construction of market-based fear gauges in selected countries or market segments. In the empirical part of the paper I focus on the European financial sector and find the credit-implied volatilities and fear gauges to behave well. The forecasting accuracy of the credit-implied volatilities is found to be better than that of horizonmatched historical volatilities. CreditGrades and its sponsors 2
Introduction
Volatility plays a very important role in finance. It is not only used on a day-to-day basis by banks and other investors in risk management and derivatives pricing, but it is also frequently used by central banks and financial regulators in measures of financial stability. Typically, outof-sample forecasts of future volatility are more useful than in-sample estimates of past volatility, and volatility forecasting has therefore kept both academics and practitioners busy for the last twenty years. Up until 2002, Poon and Granger (2003) counts at least 93 published articles and working papers that study the forecasting performance of different volatility models, and over the last ten years the list of articles has become even longer. This huge body of research is testament to the importance of financial volatility, and in this paper I build on this literature by estimating and forecasting so-called credit-implied stock return volatilities. Byström (2013) describes how one can back out implied stock return volatilities (as well as implied stock prices) from credit default swaps (CDS) using a model linking stock prices to credit derivatives prices in the same way as ordinary implied stock return volatilities are backed out from call-or put-options prices using the Black Scholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973) . The credit-implied volatilities differ from traditional equity-implied volatilities by reflecting the sentiment of the credit derivatives market rather than the equity options market. In addition, the credit-implied volatilities look several years into the future while equity-implied volatilities typically look just some months ahead. While there are many methods of modelling and predicting volatility, models specifically focused on long-term volatility forecasts are much less prevalent. The innate long-term focus of the credit-implied stock volatilities therefore has the potential to make them particularly useful in forecasting volatility over the long horizon.
universe of firms in different industries. Fifth, finally, the time-series dynamics of my financial fear gauges are compared to several other fear gauges as well as systematic risk indicators.
I find the time-varying properties of the individual credit-implied volatilities quite similar to those of historical (sample) volatilities. The same holds for the aggregated (CIVX) index of credit-implied volatilities when it is compared to well-known equity-implied volatility indexes such as VIX, VSTOXX and VSTOXX 24M. Compared to historical volatilities, however, the credit-implied volatilities lack ghost effects, and compared to equity-implied volatilities, the credit-implied volatilities demonstrate much less short-term fluctuations (noise). Moreover, the forecasting accuracy of the credit-implied volatilities is generally better than that of horizonmatched historical volatilities; the forecasting errors are not only on average smaller but they are also more stable over time. The credit-implied volatilities are inherently forward-looking and the
Europe-wide CIVX financial fear gauge correlates with the Composite Indicator of Systemic
Stress (CISS) developed by the European Central Bank (Hollo et al., 2012) . Furthermore, the country-specific fear gauges demonstrate a behavior consistent with the country-specific economic and financial development, not least during the recent turbulent crisis-period. On the individual firm level, finally, the ranking of our European banks' level of credit-implied volatility at the height of the euro-crisis is similar to the ranking of Moody's long-term credit ratings for the same set of banks. In other words, whether I look at the pan-European level, the countryspecific level or the firm level, the behavior of the credit-implied volatility is consistent with that of other well-known volatility-and stress measures.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two describes my method of backing out stock return volatilities from the credit market. Chapter three describes various ways in which these volatilities can be used, and chapter four presents the empirical study of credit-implied volatilities and volatility indexes in the European financial sector. Chapter five, finally, concludes the paper.
Credit-Implied Stock Return Volatilities
While ordinary (equity-) implied volatilities typically are backed out from traded call-and putoptions using the industry benchmark Black-Scholes options pricing model (Black & Scholes, 1973 ) my credit-implied volatilities are instead backed out from credit default swaps (CDS) using the industry benchmark CreditGrades CDS pricing model (CreditGrades, 2002 ). The
CreditGrades model links a firm's default swap price (spread) with the firm's stock price, stock return volatility and debt level using a set of model assumptions similar to those behind the Black-Scholes model. While the CreditGrades model typically is used to calculate credit default swap spreads I instead follow Byström (2013) by solving the CreditGrades model backwards; i.e. I back out stock return volatilities that are consistent with empirically observed CDS spreads and stock prices. The process is directly comparable to traditional methods of backing out implied volatilities, but with the equity option market replaced by the credit derivatives market.
The CreditGrades (2002) model is similar in spirit to the Merton (1974 ) model and, just like Merton (1974 it models the risk that a firm defaults on its debt. Both models assume that default occurs whenever a firm's asset value, V t , falls below its debt level, D. While the Merton model assumes a constant recovery rate, L t , however, CreditGrades introduces randomness to the recovery rate. L t represents the global recovery rate on all liabilities of the firm while R is the recovery on the specific liability underlying the credit default swap that is to be priced.
CreditGrades further models the asset value as a standard geometric Brownian motion and 6 defines default as the point when the asset value falls below the (stochastic) default threshold L t D. The CreditGrades CDS spread for a certain maturity, T, is then equal to
where P(t) is the survival probability
and where
 is the asset return volatility, r is the risk-free interest rate and L mean and  is the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the log-normally distributed global recovery rate, L t . The asset return volatility, , is calculated from the stock return volatility,  E , since the asset value process is not observable. To calculate the asset return volatility CreditGrades uses the linear CreditGrades model instead has to deal with the estimation of the stochastic recovery rate (the recovery rate in CreditGrades is comparable to the strike price in Black-Scholes).
When Are Credit-Implied Stock Return Volatilities Useful?
There are numerous ways of estimating and forecasting stock return volatilities. The most natural way is perhaps to extract the volatility directly from the stock returns themselves using more or less advanced time-series methods. Another way is to focus on options traded on the stock and extract the implied stock return volatility using an options pricing model such as the BlackScholes model. In this paper I have chosen the implied volatility alternative but instead of following the ordinary path of backing out the volatility from an equity option, such as an ordinary stock call-option, I back out the volatility from a credit derivative, more exactly from the price of a credit default swap. These credit-implied stock return volatilities can be interpreted as the credit market's opinion on the likely future variability in the equity market and as such they represent an alternative estimate/forecast of stock volatility with unique properties. Below, I discuss some potential applications of this volatility measure.
Pricing of Long Maturity Employee Stock Options and Other Derivatives
Employee stock options, convertible securities, and warrants are examples of equity derivatives that require long-term volatility forecasts, sometimes as far out as five to seven years, to be accurately priced (Alford & Boatsman, 1995) . The reason is the long expected term of such contracts before they are exercised or called. When it comes to employee stock options there is an additional reason for why accurate pricing of such options is important, i.e. the requirement of firms to report the cost of their employee stock options to the authorities. The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), for example, requires US firms to properly recognize the full cost of stock options granted to their employees (Jiang & Tian, 2010) . In a financial reporting, and accounting, context the typical method of forecasting volatility is to extrapolate historical volatility estimates into the future. Often, the estimation period is chosen to match the forecasting horizon, so-called horizon-matching. The somewhat ad-hoc character of this approach, however, has led to the common practice of using option-implied volatilities instead (Reitter, 2012) . Implied options have the advantage of being forward-looking but are only available to firms with traded equity options. Furthermore, equity options tend to have much shorter maturities than the five to seven years needed to accurately price employee stock options and other similar derivatives.
As an alternative to both historical volatilities and option-implied volatilities I therefore suggest that credit-implied volatilities are used when pricing employee stock options and other long-term equity derivatives. These volatilities have several advantages. First, they are, per construction, long-term volatilities since credit default swaps have maturities ranging from one to ten years. Second, they are strictly forward-looking which is appealing since it is the expected future volatility that is needed when pricing for instance employee stock options. Third, no stock price history is needed when constructing the forecast. The latter is an advantage for instance if a firm recently went public or if its stock is illiquid.
1 In these situations neither historical volatilities nor option-implied volatilities can be relied upon. Fourth, by being backed out from the credit market rather than from the equity market, credit-implied volatilities are likely to represent a different risk-return view-point than the equity-based volatilities. Even though it is impossible to tell which view-point is the better, it is possible that a careful selection, or even a combination of forecasts from both the equity-and the credit-side of the capital structure, paints a more accurate picture of the long-term future volatility of a stock. To sum up, there are several reasons to use creditimplied volatilities when pricing employee stock options and other long-term equity derivatives such as convertible securities and warrants.
Construction of Credit Based Fear Indexes
Byström (2013) suggests a credit-based "fear gauge" based on portfolios of credit-implied volatilities as an alternative to the well-known CBOE VIX index, the widely used equity-based fear gauge. While the VIX index is backed out from the equity option market the Byström (2013) credit-implied volatility index (CIVX) is backed out from the credit derivatives market.
Consequently, while the VIX index quantifies the equity market´s beliefs of future market-wide stock market volatility, the CIVX index instead quantifies the credit market´s beliefs of the same volatility.
The individual credit-implied volatilities used to compute the CIVX index are backed out from the credit default swap market, which nowadays is a very liquid market. Byström (2013) bases his volatility indexes on portfolios of single-name credit default swaps, but established and widely used indexes of credit default swaps such as the iTraxx-and CDX indexes could possibly also be used for the development of regional and country-specific fear gauges. Such region-or branch-specific volatility indexes, whether they are backed out using single-name CDS contracts or CDS indexes, are likely to appeal to market participants; in fact, Goltz and Tang (2011) reports of a recent investor survey made by Edhec-Risk Institute where lack of choice when it comes to volatility indexes is ranked as the most important limitation of the volatility market. Compared to traditional implied volatilities, as well as fear gauges such as the VIX index, that are backed out from equity options, the credit-implied volatilities are backed out from a much younger market.
Nonetheless, the growth of the credit derivatives market over the last decade has led to credit derivatives increasingly covering more and more regions, countries, industries as well as firms. In fact, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in their "OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2013" report from November 2013 reports much larger notional amounts outstanding for credit default swaps (24500 billion US dollars) than for for equity options (4600 billion US dollars). In other words, the future potential of the credit default swap market, when it comes to extracting stock return volatilities, is at least as strong as that of the equity option market.
Moreover, a nice feature of the CIVX index is that it can be designed to focus on as long-term forecasts as five to ten years. This is not normally possible when equity options are used to back out implied volatilities; the VIX index is for instance based on options maturing in one month's time. VIX is not the only fear indicator that is based on (short-term) equity options. The Credit Suisse Fear Barometer (CSFB), for example, is based on the relative pricing of 3-month OTM put and call-options; the more expensive the put-option is relative to the call-option, the higher the level of fear (Xu, 2012) . Compared to these rather myopic fear gauges the CIVX index looks further into the future and, depending on the maturity of the credit default swaps, is readily available in different versions with horizons ranging from one to ten years.
An index such as CIVX is not necessarily interpreted as a fear gauge; it can also, possibly, be interpreted as an indicator of systemic risk. There are many different systemic risk indicators available; some, but not all, driven by stock return volatilities. The European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, has developed their Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) that measures the degree of instability in the financial system as a whole using a battery of stress indicators (Hollo et al., 2012) . Compared to complicated indicators such as CISS, however, simple indicators such as CIVX have the advantage of being both easy to compute and of having a clear-cut interpretation. Whether the CIVX index has the other properties needed of an indicator of systemic stress is an open issue that will be studied further in the empirical part of this paper.
Risk Management
An asset's (market) risk is often measured, directly or indirectly, as the volatility of the asset's returns. For a stock this typically means that the stock return volatility has to be estimated or, regularly represented by the volatility, but so is credit risk. In commonly used models such as Merton (1974) , one of the most important inputs when estimating default probabilities and credit losses is the asset's long-term volatility. While there are many methods of modelling and predicting volatility, models specifically focused on long-term forecasts are much less prevalent.
Credit risk is, however, one area of risk management where long-term volatility forecasts are required. It is not the only area, though, and any novel way of forecasting future (long-term) volatility is therefore welcome. The credit-implied volatility described in this paper is one such example.
Trading and Arbitrage
For options traders to beat the market they need more accurate volatility forecasts than other market participants. Since volatility changes in a seemingly stochastic fashion, volatility forecasting typically involves complex modelling of the volatility dynamics. Or, alternatively, one backs out volatilities from various derivatives contracts, often from call-or put options with a different underlying stock or a different strike price or maturity. Here, I suggest that these traders look further afield and back out equity volatilities from the credit market instead. If the credit market happens to be better informed than the equity market, credit-implied stock return volatilities could be better at predicting the future than those hailing directly from the equity market, and consequently generate profits to the options trader. This approach could be particularly profitable when pricing illiquid long-term options such as warrants. And of course, nothing stops credit derivatives traders from doing the same; i.e. the credit derivatives trader can mimic the strategies used by equity options traders and use credit-implied volatilities of one set of firms to price credit derivatives on another set of firms.
Arbitrageurs could also profit from taking positions based on the credit-implied volatility and on its relationship to equity-based volatilities, whether historical or implied. Credit derivatives such as credit defaults swaps are often priced off the equity market and the stock return volatility is then the single most important input parameter (Cao et al., 2011) . A discrepancy between equity-based and credit-based stock return volatilities could therefore indicate arbitrage possibilities for traders trading across the capital structure, i.e. for capital structure arbitrageurs (Yu, 2006; Duarte et al., 2007) .
Credit-Implied Stock Return Volatilities in the European Financial Sector -An Empirical Analysis
In this section, I empirically examine the properties of credit-implied stock return volatilities. I have chosen to focus on financial firms, i.e. banks and insurance companies, since the backing out of volatilities is likely to be more difficult for financial firms than for non-financial firms due to the former's often rather opaque capital structure. Moreover, my choice of European financial firms is motivated by the long-lasting turbulence in the European financial sector. Both the US- Business. The yearly debt-to-equity ratios are transformed to daily data using a linear interpolation between year-end observations and are then used to compute daily debt levels.
While our study of credit-implied stock volatilities is limited by the fairly young stage of the credit default swap market it should be stressed that although the equity market, of course, covers many more firms than the CDS market this is not necessary the case for the stock options markets typically used to extract implied volatilities. In other words, the limits of our study when it comes to the number of firms and the length of the time-period should be seen in the light of similar studies of equity option-implied stock volatilities.
Credit-Implied Stock Return Volatilities
This section focuses on individual firm volatilities and the next section (section 4.2.) focuses on volatility (fear) indexes. Our credit-implied volatilities are computed using the industry benchmark CreditGrades model; i.e. a particular firm's implied stock return volatility is backed out from the firm's CDS spread, stock price and debt level (analogue to call option price, stock price and exercise price in ordinary calculations of implied volatilities). All the implied volatilities are computed on a daily basis and are, essentially, the credit derivatives market's longterm forecasts of the firm's stock return volatility over the coming 5-year period (since I use 5-year credit default swaps).
The CreditGrades model requires estimates of the mean global recovery rate, L mean , the standard deviation of the global recovery rate, , as well as the bond-specific recovery rate, R. In this study while the average leverage ratio for large European banks over the same time-period is roughly ten times that, varying from 22 to 26. As a result, I believe that =0.03 gives a reasonable estimate of the level of uncertainty attached to the default barrier for a typical financial firm in Europe over the last ten years. Of course, in real-life practical situations one would probably want to estimate  using large data bases of financial firms' empirical recovery rates (CreditGrades, 2002) . Or alternatively, if ease of implementation is more important than accuracy, the standard assumption of a constant recovery rate is consistent with =0.
As mentioned, financial firms differ from non-financial firms by being much more leveraged.
This would, ceteris paribus, result in financial firms having much higher credit default swap spreads than similar non-financial firms. The government often supports financial firms in times of crisis, however, and, as mentioned by the CreditGrades Technical Document, this makes financial firms' "effective leverage ratio lower than that implied by standard debt-per-share calculations". Again, the CreditGrades Technical Document does not give any information on how much lower this "effective leverage ratio" should be for financial firms. As a result, I
calculate effective debt levels for my financial firms by multiplying the actual debt levels by a half (0.5). This choice shares similarities with the way Moody's|KMV chooses the default point in its KMV model as the sum of the short-term debt and half the value of the long-term debt. 2 In practical situation I reckon that a more careful analysis of the firms' capital structure would be useful when calculating credit-implied volatilities.
Volatility Comparisons
In this sub-section, the credit-implied stock return volatilities are compared to ordinary historical volatilities estimated using either 1 year, 3 years or 5 years of historical stock returns. The forecast accuracy of the various volatilities is presented in the next sub-section (sub-section 4.1.2.), and all through the paper I follow Jiang & Tian (2010) Table 1 . Meanwhile, in Figure 1 the volatility dynamics is presented on a firm by firm basis.
From the average values in Table 1 it is evident that the standard deviation of the implied volatility is lower than the standard deviations of the three historical volatility measures.
Meanwhile, the standard deviation of the historical volatility estimate is, not surprisingly, lower the longer the window used. The variability of the implied volatility is consequently most similar to the 5-year historical volatility despite being instantaneously backed out. The mean volatility is also lowest for the implied volatility estimator (35.7%) but a comparison with the historical volatilities is not straightforward since the credit-implied volatility is forward-looking (covering [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] [2018] and the historical volatility is backward-looking (covering 1999-2013).
The volatilities of the individual financial firms are plotted in Figure 1 and a visual inspection of the volatility graphs reveals that both the credit-implied volatility and the (1-year and 5-year)
historical volatilities demonstrate a clear upward trend across the 10-year time-period, at least for most firms. In other words, the volatility is typically higher towards the end than towards the start of the sample, regardless of how the volatility is estimated. Due to its instantaneous character the credit-implied volatility, of course, varies much more from day to day than the two smoothed out historical volatilities but it also lacks the typical ghost effects of long-window historical estimates (which is the reason for its lower standard deviation). Interestingly, the financial crisis has a much less profound effect on the implied volatility than on the two historical volatilities where, Table 2 where I have ranked the 23
European banks' credit-implied volatilities at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis (June 2012) from lowest to highest and compared it with the ranking of the banks' credit ratings at the same point in time (June 2012). 3 From basic financial theory (Merton (1974) ) one would expect a negative link between a firm's stock volatility and its credit rating and Table 2 confirms this by demonstrating a fairly strong negative link between my credit-implied volatilities and
Moody's long-term credit ratings for banks in Europe during the recent financial crisis; for example, all the (three) top-rated banks occupy the three lowest volatility slots and the (single) worst rated bank has the highest credit-implied volatility etc.
Forecast Accuracy
In section 3, I discussed some areas where credit-implied stock volatilities could be useful, and in many of these applications the most important feature of the volatility measure is the extent to which it is able to predict future stock return volatility. Whether one wants to price complex longterm employee stock options or simply wants to price and manage the risk of one's equity portfolio, perhaps using Value at Risk or some other widely used risk measure, the future volatility is the most crucial input. In this sub-section I will therefore investigate the forecasting ability of the credit-implied volatilities computed in the previous sub-section. Since the focus in this paper, first and foremost, is on long-term (1-year to 5-year) forecasts, I compare the implied volatilities to simple (model-free) historical volatilities. That is, no GARCH models, stochastic volatility models, regime switching models or any other advanced model focusing mainly on shorter horizons is included in the study. This choice is also motivated by the finding that more complex volatility models often perform worse when the forecast horizon is long. Instead, historical volatilities, estimated over a period that is at least as long as the forecast horizon, often work best when making long-term forecasts (Reitter, 2012) . Moreover, our interest in long historical estimation windows also stems from the current Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and its accounting treatment of employee stock options, where an acceptable way of forecasting volatility is to use horizon-matched historical volatility (Jiang & Tian, 2010) .
Unfortunately, our long forecasting horizons exclude any possibility of comparing directly with equity option-implied volatilities since few equity options have maturities extending beyond a year.
To evaluate the forecasting performance of the credit-implied volatility I compare the volatility forecast with the realized (sample) volatility over the forecasting horizon using daily data. The results are summarized in Table 3 and show that regardless of how the forecasting accuracy is measured the credit-implied volatility is better at forecasting future realized stock return volatility than historical volatility is. It is only at the longest 5-year horizon that the (5-year) historical volatility forecast produces smaller errors and even at that horizon the credit-implied forecasts are better than both the 1-year and 3-year historical forecasts. Our main focus is on multi-year forecast but even at the shorter 6-month horizon the credit-implied volatility does a relatively good job. 5 One reason behind the superior forecasting performance of the creditimplied volatility could be its inherent forward-looking properties; the credit-implied volatility can be interpreted as the collective opinion of the credit derivatives market about the future variability in the stock market. Despite historical volatilities' relative long-term forecasting superiority in the literature (Alford & Boatsman, 1995) historical volatilities are still just estimates of stocks' past variability without any obvious intrinsic forward-looking ability.
From Table 3 it is clear that at longer horizons, all forecasts regardless of method, are negatively biased, i.e. the realized volatility is higher than the forecasted volatility, 6 while at the shortest horizon (6 months Regardless of forecasting horizon the (less volatile) credit-implied forecasts are relatively more stable than the three historical volatilities in the sense that the forecasting error is never largest; not at any single date over the sample period is either the error or absolute error in the creditimplied forecasts the largest of the four. Meanwhile, the errors in all of the three historical volatility forecasts are the largest at one point or another. Furthermore, the size of the creditimplied forecasting error is much more stable over time and it never explodes to the extent that the historical volatility forecasts errors all, occasionally, tend to do.
There are few studies dealing with long-term forecasting of stock return volatility (Jiang & Tian, 2010 ) but compared to both Jiang & Tian (2010) and Alford & Boatsman (1995) , the errors in this study, when historical volatility is used, are quite large. While the horizon-matched median absolute 5-year forecasting error in this study (of large financial firms in Europe) is 
European Financial Sector Fear Indexes
As an alternative to the well-known equity-based VIX fear gauge, Byström (2013) financial firms in Europe, the second peak (or peaks) is even higher than the first peak at around 50% annual volatility. This is about twice the volatility observed before the crisis. Towards the end of the sample, from about July 2012 to November 2013, the fear recedes but despite this drop the fear (volatility) remains much higher than before the crisis.
The dynamics of the CIVX Fin,EU fear index can be compared to that of the VIX fear index. The VIX index is backed out from options on the firms in the S&P500 US stock index and, just like the CIVX Fin,EU index, the fear, as measured by the VIX index, starts increasing in 2007. Unlike the CIVX Fin,EU index, however, the VIX index has just one distinct extreme peak (in October 2008) that is much higher than any of the other peaks. The extreme 2008-peak is followed by two lower peaks in mid-2010 and late 2011. Overall, the two fear indexes, CIVX Fin,EU and VIX, tend to peak and bottom at roughly the same points in time (the sample correlation is 0.40) while their general daily-and weekly movements tend to be more idiosyncratic. One of the most notable differences between the two fear indexes is the VIX index' steady decrease from September 2012 onwards that eventually levels out at levels that are as low as those before the crisis. This is in sharp contrast to the CIVX Fin,EU index where the volatility in late 2013 is about one and a half times as high as that before the crisis. This discrepancy is possibly a signal that the credit market is having a more pessimistic stock market outlook than the equity market itself.
It should be remembered that a direct comparison of the two indexes is not 
Country-Specific Fear Indexes
In this sub-section I calculate individual country fear indexes for those of the eleven European 
Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to compute long-term stock return volatilities using credit derivatives (as described in Byström (2013) Europe-wide level and on country-and firm-specific levels. Furthermore, the volatility dynamics is similar to existing indexes and indicators. Differences exist, however, particularly in the highfrequency domain (i.e. day-to-day or month-to-month movements). This is not surprising considering that the credit-implied CIVX indexes contain unique forward-looking information from a unique market, i.e. the credit derivatives market. 
